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Paper presented at the CERF/CSLS Conference on the Canada-U.S. Unemployment Gap, Ottawa,
Feb 9-10, 1996.  The authors would like to thank Herb Schuetze for capable and conscientious
research assistance, and the discussants, Gary Burtless and Richard Freeman,  whose suggestions
to explore the differences between “full-employment” years more closely changed the paper
considerably.  Participants at the CERF/CSLS preconference on the Canada-US unemployment
gap, and at the 1996 North American Economics and Finance Association Annual meetings,
especially Alice Nakamura, also provided helpful comments.1. Introduction.
As is well known, beginning in the early 1980's a sizable gap opened up between the
unemployment rates of Canada and the United States-- two countries which up to that time had
experienced very similar, and highly correlated, unemployment rates.  Since that time,
considerable research into the possible causes of this gap has taken place (e.g. Ashenfelter and
Card (1986), Milbourne, Purvis and Scoones (1991); Card and Riddell (1993)), with the relatively
more generous Canadian Unemployment Insurance system commonly cited as a potential
explanation.    
Another phenomenon that has characterized both Canadian and U.S. labour markets since
the early 1980's is a considerable increase in wage polarization, or spreading out of the wage
distribution, especially among men:  the market wages available to the least skilled men in the
both the U.S. and Canadian economies fell considerably, while those of more-skilled men either
held their own or increased slightly (see, e.g. Kuhn and Robb, 1995).  Interestingly, in a
relatively recent paper, Juhn, Murphy and Topel (1991) (henceforth JMT), argue that this wage
polarization might be an important cause of the apparent secular increase in unemployment in the
United States between 1967 and 1989.  Essentially, they see the increase in U.S. male
unemployment as a voluntary labour supply response to the declining market demand for less-
skilled workers:  As the real market wages available to this group fell, unskilled men found it
relatively more attractive to spend time in a variety of nonmarket activities, much of which was
labelled by the individuals involved as unemployment.  
More recently, a number of analysts (e.g. OECD (1994) and Freeman (1995), among
others) have suggested that shifting skill demand, in combination with differences in the3
       A closely related hypothesis is that countries in which real wages are downward rigid due t o
1
instituti onal  factors like minimum wages will experience an increase in unemployment among th e
unskilled  because wages cannot fall enough to clear the market.  Such a model has very simila r
implications  for the covariation of employment  rates and wage rates across the skill distribution as
a  mar ket-clearing model, and we do not attempt to distinguish these two stories in this paper. (I t
would  show up in our analysis  as a very elastic "labour supply" locus at low wage levels).   We do
n ote, however, that according to our data there has been  considerable downward real wage flexibility
among  le ss-skilled Canadian males in the past two decades, even relative to the "quintessentiall y
flexible" U.S.  
institutional structure of labour markets, might help explain not only within-country secular trends
in unemployment, but differences between countries.  Simply put, the idea is that in countries with
more generous social safety nets, workers (and especially those near the bottom of the wage
distribution) will be more likely to withdraw from market work onto that safety net when market
demand for labour shifts against them.   Since Canada has often been cited as a "kinder, gentler"
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country in social policy than the U.S., this "OECD hypothesis" thus seems like a promising
potential explanation of the emergence of the Canada-U.S. unemployment gap in the 1980's.  
The main purpose of this paper is to ascertain whether the JMT and OECD hypotheses
outlined above can indeed provide a convincing and consistent explanation of (a) the recent large
increase in Canadian unemployment and/or (b) the emergence of the Canada-U.S. unemployment
rate gap.  Following JMT, our approach  is based on an examination of the covariation of changes
in employment rates, unemployment rates and wage rates across deciles of the wage distribution,
in Canada and the U.S.  Given that the recent increase in wage polarization, especially in the form
of real wage declines among the less skilled, has been much more concentrated among men in
both countries, our focus here is on men only:  If the JMT hypothesis "works" anywhere, it ought
to work for men.  Further, to avoid complications associated with changes in school attendance4
       In the Ma rch 1973 CPS, information on annual weeks worked is available in intervals only.  To
2
d eal with this issue in comparisons involving that data set we r ecoded actual weeks in the  other three
data  s ets involved (1989 CPS; 1973 and 1989 SCF) into the same intervals and took means usin g
midpoints  of these intervals.   Another potential comparability issue is that unlike the CPS, th e
Cana dian  SCF does not provide information on men living with their parents in the 1970's .
Examination of the Can adian data after 1980 indicate that this has only a very minor effect on mean
employment and wage levels among men in the age group considered here.  
rates and in early retirement behaviour, we restrict our attention to "prime age" men:  those
between 25 and 54, the age-sex group with the strongest labour force attachment.  The data
employed are retrospective questions on weeks worked, and weeks unemployed in the calendar
years 1973, 1977, 1989 and 1992 in Canada, and 1973, 1975, 1989 and 1992 in the United States,
taken from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) March Current Population Survey (CPS)
respectively.   The advantages of these data are (a) that annual weeks of unemployment give a
2
much more detailed picture of an individual's unemployment experience than does a point-in-time
indicator of labour force status; and (b) that (unlike the determination of current labour force
status) the retrospective questions on unemployment and employment are simple, and very similar
across both countries and time (Actual questions and definitions of the retrospective weeks
questions are given in Appendix 1).  
The years chosen for the current analysis reflect two main considerations.  First, we want
years before and after the Canada-U.S. unemployment gap opened up.  Second, we want to
control as well as possible for cyclical effects on employment and unemployment, and are
particularly interested in secular changes between years in which the economy is at “full
employment”:  i.e. at a cyclical peak when workers are least likely to be constrained in their
labour supply decisions.  To that end, the bulk of our analysis focuses on the years 1973 and5
       Of course, Freeman and Needels considered only those skill diff erentials attributable to education,
3
whereas we consider overall wage inequality here.  
1989, in which unemployment rates were at a local minimum in both countries.  To provide some
indication of more recent trends, however, and to get some idea of the robustness of our results
to our particular choice of years, a comparison of the 1992 recession in both countries with the
mid-1970's recession is also provided.
In our analysis we identify four main pieces of evidence which support the JMT/OECD
hypotheses, suggest one refinement to it which makes it more consistent with the 1973-89 changes
in Canada and the U.S., but also point out one outstanding difficulty with the hypothesis that
appears to require further study.  The first piece of evidence in favour of JMT/OECD concerns
wage polarization:  Our data do show considerable wage polarization in both countries under
study, and indeed seem to show considerably more wage polarization among Canadian men than
has been noted in some earlier studies of Canadian wage structure (e.g. Freeman and Needels,
1993) .  For example, the tenth percentile of the real average weekly earnings distribution of full-
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time Canadian male workers fell by 19.5 percent between the “full employment” years 1973 and
1989, which, while not as  dramatic as the 27.0% fall experienced by U.S. men over essentially
the same period, is certainly substantial.    
Second, again in support of a “labour supply response to declining demand” interpretation,
the wage decline noted above is apparently linked to a decrease in employment: annual weeks
worked by prime-age men fell in both countries (by 2.2 weeks in Canada and by 1 week in the
U.S.), and the decline was concentrated among those men (nearer the bottom of the wage
distribution) who experienced the largest proportional declines in real wages.  Third, as suggested6
      Indeed most of the secular  increase in U.S. unemployment studied by JMT occurs prior to the
4
1970's.
by the OECD hypothesis, both the aggregate and within-decile responses of weeks worked to wage
declines were larger in Canada than the U.S.:  smaller wage declines were associated wth larger
employment declines, suggesting the availability of better nonmarket alternatives in Canada. 
Finally, and crucially to the ability of the OECD/JMT hypothesis to explain trends in
unemployment, the declines in employment noted above are, at least in one of the two countries
under study, strongly linked to increases in unemployment, rather than for example to labour force
withdrawal.   In particular, of the 2.2 week aggregate secular drop in Canadian prime-age male
employment, fully 1.7 weeks took the form of increased unemployment, with only a 0.5 week-
increase in nonparticipation.  Further, and perhaps more convincingly, the pattern of change in
unemployment across deciles of the Canadian wage distribution strongly mirrors the pattern of
changes in weeks worked, but not the pattern of changes in weeks in the labour force.
The one refinement we suggest to the JMT/OECD account of changes in male
unemployment results from the following observation: while a strong link between secular declines
in employment and secular increases in unemployment is evident in Canada, it is not in the United
States.   In fact, the one-week aggregate drop  in U.S. male employment between 1973 and 1989
was accompanied by a slight decline in unemployment, because weeks of nonparticipation rose
by 1.3 weeks overall, and much more (4 to 6 weeks) in the bottom wage decile.  This huge
increase in labour force nonparticipation of unskilled US men of course raises a serious question
about the relevance of the JMT “labour supply” hypothesis to recent U.S. trends in male
unemployment.   More importantly, it suggests that differences in the “destination states” of
47
      While “relabelling” of a fixed or diminishing amount  of nonworking time may be an important
5
phenomenon  for Canadian women, Card and Riddell report similar declines to  those found here in
men’s  relative Canadian-US employment levels.  (Because they do not specifically choose years at
c omparable stages in the business cycle, changes in levels w ithin countries are not informative in their
a pproach).  Between 1979 and 1986, when relative Canadian un employment rose by .84 weeks,  they
report  t hat the relative employment of Canadian male heads fell by 1.28 weeks (clearly more tha n
enough  to  account for the change in relative unemployment).  Comparable statistics for 1981 an d
1 989 from their 1995 paper are .8 and 1.8, respectively , for adult men, and .5 and .1 for male youths.
unskilled workers moving out of employment may also explain some of Canada-US unemployment
gap:  men leaving employment in countries with generous unemployment insurance programs, like
Canada, may be less likely to leave the labour force than those in countries like the U.S.  This
apparent difference in the labour force withdrawal rates of unskilled Canadian and American men
is of course related to, but --because it is driven by a reduction in employment-- somewhat distinct
from, Card and Riddell's (1993, 1995) hypothesis of the “relabelling” of nonworking time.
5
The main difficulty we point out regarding the applicability of the JMT/OECD model to
Canada and the U.S. concerns the size of the employment declines observed in Canada between
1973 and 1989.   Interestingly, while (as JMT have already noted) the cross-sectional association
between wages and annual weeks of work is a surprisingly good predictor of the effects of wage
changes over this period in the U.S., it is not so in Canada, where the employment changes
observed over time appear to be significantly greater than what one would expect based on cross-
sectional patterns.  We conclude that either the bias involved in using cross-sectional profiles to
estimate time-series responses is very different in the US and Canada (which seems unlikely) or
that there was indeed a shift in the Canadian labour supply locus over this period:  i.e. there
appear to be some employment declines, especially in the higher wage decile groups in Canada,8
       Put an other way, unskilled US males worked about the same in 1992 as in 1975, despite a  real
6
wage decline of about 25% over that period.  
which  cannot easily be explained by declining market wages.  This difficulty is exacerbated when
we consider data taken from the recessions of 1992 and the mid-1970's in the two countries: while
similar in many respects, the Canadian data now suggest an even greater leftward shift, and the
US data now actually suggest a rightward shift in male labour supply: at comparable real wages,
US men worked considerably more in the 1992 recession than in the one in 1975.   While this
6
might result from the greater severity of the 1975 than the 1992 recession in the US (the US, as
a greater net importer, was harder hit by the first oil shock), it does suggest that attention to
factors which might shift labour supply curves over time deserve further investigation. 
In the remainder of the paper we proceed by first documenting the considerable wage
polarization, as well as the overall changes in annual weeks of work, unemployment and labour
force nonparticipation that occurred among prime-age men in both countries between 1973 and
1989.  We then disaggregate the above trends across deciles of the wage distribution between 1973
and 1989 and consider whether these disaggregated trends are consistent with the JMT and OECD
hypotheses regarding the determinants of long-run changes in male unemployment.  Next, we
document the divergence between cross-sectional and time series labour supply responses which
makes us reluctant to accept the JMT explanation as the only factor behind falling Canadian
employment over this period: there appear to be some employment declines quite high up in the
Canadian wage distribution, where real wages did not fall substantially over this period.   Finally,
we provide comparative evidence on US and Canadian labour markets in the recessions of 1992
and the mid-1970's, and ask what it can add to our account of the Canada-US unemployment gap.9
      We de fine full year workers as those who worked 49 or more weeks in the previous year ,
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includin g  paid vacations.  "Full time" means that the respondent said that the work he did in th e
previous year was mostly full-time work.  
       The l arger real wage declines reported here for the U.S. than in some previous work (e.g. Katz
8
and   Murphy, 1992) result in part from our use of the CPI rather than the implicit GDP deflator for
consumption expenditures, and in part from the different time period considered.   
 2. Wage Polarization, Employment and Unemployment: Aggregate Trends. 
The most reliable, comparable wage information on the Canadian SCF and U.S. CPS is
probably the annual earnings of full-time, full-year workers.   The percentiles of the distribution
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of this variable for the “full employment” years, 1973 and 1989 in both countries are given in
Table 1(a).  To make the numbers as comparable as possible across both countries and years, both
in this Table and throughout the rest of the paper, we first converted all dollars to 1992 dollars
in each country using its own all-items CPI.   We then converted all the U.S. dollar amounts into
8
Canadian dollar amounts using 1992 purchasing power parity numbers from the Penn World
Tables.  One advantage of this approach is that our measures of rates of change over time in each
country will be "true" to that country's own CPI, and thus should be comparable to the results of
previous studies on each country individually.  
As Table 1(a) shows, there was considerable wage polarization among prime-age men in
both countries over the period under study, with real wages essentially unchanged or increasing
slightly near the top of the wage distribution, but falling at the median and bottom.  Median real
wages rose by 3.5 percent in Canada, while falling by about nine percent in the U.S. 
Considerably more dramatic are the real wage declines at the tenth percentile of the wage10
distribution, amounting to 13.5 and 24 percent respectively in Canada and the U.S. 
Since most of the analysis in this paper considers the relation between weeks worked, or
weeks unemployed, per year and the weekly wage available to workers, Table 1(b) presents
percentiles of the average weekly earnings distribution for full time, but not necessarily full-year
workers.  The results are very similar, with an even smaller difference between the amount of
wage polarization occurring in Canada and the United States.  Interestingly, for average weekly
earnings, the more-rapid decline of men's real wages in the U.S. led to a reversal of the relative
median wages in the two countries, when compared at purchasing power parity levels:  In the mid
1970's the median U.S. male had a higher wage than his Canadian counterpart; by the end of the
1980's this situation was reversed.  
Aggregate trends in annual weeks worked, unemployed and out of the labour force are
presented for both countries in Table 2.  As expected, the data clearly show the emergence of a
Canada-US unemployment gap: Canadian men spent a slightly smaller fraction of the year (less
than half a week) unemployed than American men in 1973.  By 1989, Canadian men were
unemployed almost 1.8 more weeks per year than American men.   As the Table also indicates,
this gap emerged because (comparing business cycle peak to peak) Canadian unemployment rose,
not because US unemployment fell (US unemployment remained approximately unchanged over
this period).  
Table 2 also gives a very clear indication of whether the growth of Canadian male
unemployment  came at the expense of time spent at work, or time spent out of the labour force:
it came at the expense of work. Canadian men worked more than their US counterparts in the
1970's, and about the same in 1989.  Indeed, the 2.2-week decline in weeks worked among11
Canadian men is more than enough to account for the 1.7-week increase in unemployment noted
above.   US men decreased their annual work weeks by an average of one week.  Unlike Canada,
however, this did not feed into an increase in unemployment; rather nonparticipation increased
by more than enough to absorb the decline in employment.  
Taken together with the declines in male wages seen in both countries,  these trends are
consistent with the following account of how the Canada-US unemployment emerged:  Market
wages available to both Canadian and US men fell over the period, and men in both countries
responded to this decline in market opportunities by working less.  However, despite the fact that
the wage decline was somewhat less in Canada,  the response was different because of institutional
differences between the two countries:  Canadian men reduced their labour supply more, and when
doing so were more likely to remain in the labour market, spending their extra nonwork time as
unemployment rather than nonparticipation.  We now proceed to examine whether the
disaggregated trends in wages and labour force behaviour support this account.  
3. Disaggregated Trends and the Role of Shifting Skill Demand:  1973-1989.
Trends in wages, weeks worked and weeks unemployed, disaggregated by deciles of the
wage distribution, are presented in Tables 3 and 4.  Table 3 restricts its attention to men who did
some full-time work for pay in the year under consideration, for whom  we can calculate a weekly
wage by dividing annual earnings by weeks worked.  We then sort these men into ten decile
groups based on their calculated wage rate, and present a number of summary statistics for the
men in each decile group.  Table 4 includes those men who did no work at all in the reference
year (for whom, of course, no wage information is observed); in order to do so we assign all12
      The regression included six education categories, age and age squared, state or provinc e
9
d ummies, marital  status indicators and size of place indicators.  In general, where choices had to be
made, right-hand -side variables were constructed to be as similar as possible in definition and detail
in   the two countries and over time, even when this meant a loss of detail.  Since wages are ,
effectively ,  not observed for part-time workers, they were treated just like nonworkers in thi s
procedure.   As we could  not think of any credible instruments for the work-nonwork decision, the
regressions are all run by OLS.  
       Another potential effect of using predicted, rather than actual  wages to rank workers is to reduce
10
the  effects o f measurement error, and of temporary shocks to wages, in classifying people int o
" ability" deciles.  As we shall see, this  is reflected in the fact that, in a cross-section, predicted wages
actually are a stronger predictor of unemployment than actual wages.  
individuals to deciles by their predicted wage in a standard regression, run separately in each
country-year.   While, as is very well known, this is not a perfect solution to the problem of
9
unobserved wages for nonworkers (in part because it ranks people only on based on the observed
components of their skills) it does perform the very important function of incorporating the
contribution to unemployment of full-year nonworkers into the analysis.   
10
We begin our discussion of Tables 3 and 4 with an examination of the cross-sectional
patterns of employment and unemployment across deciles of the wage distribution within country-
years, and note first that average within-decile wage levels must, of course, by construction, rise
monotonically across deciles.   Second --except in the top one or two deciles of Table 3-- both
tables show a monotonic, positive relationship between the wage and annual weeks worked.  This
positive relationship has been interpreted by JMT as a behavioural labour supply curve, with
higher market wages encouraging greater labour supply, although we present some evidence in
this paper which might be inconsistent with this interpretation.  
The question of whether the decrease in labour supply among Table 3's top one or two
deciles (relative to the deciles immediately below them) represents true "backward-bending"13
       Essentially, the low weeks worked and  high unemployment rates in the top decile seem to result
11
f rom a small number of individuals working very  short weeks (1 to 13) per year with annual earnings
more   on the order of what a full-year worker would receive.  This could, for example, represen t
miscoding of annual earnings as an annual rate of pay.  
labour supply behaviour or a special kind of measurement error has been considered both by JMT
and Kuhn and Robb (1995);  both come down in favour of measurement error.   Thus we treat
11
our results for these top two deciles here with considerable skepticism, though we note that this
sort of measurement error appears to be considerably more serious in Canada than the U.S.
Supporting evidence for the measurement error hypothesis is the fact that the apparently
anomalous work behaviour of the top one or two wage deciles, especially in Canada, largely
disappears in Table 4, which uses predicted, rather than actual wages to rank workers.  The fact
that both the employment and unemployment differences between the top and bottom wage deciles
are considerably higher in Table 4 also suggests measurement error in wages.
  Third, still in the cross-sections, we note that the cross-sectional pattern of weeks of
unemployment consists, to a very large extent, of a mirror-image of the employment patterns:
again with the possible exception of the top two deciles, unemployment falls monotonically with
the wage a worker is capable of earning.  Like unemployment, nonparticipation in the labour
market also rises as we move down the wage distribution, excepting the top one or two deciles
where we believe there is a misclassification problem.  The cross-sectional patterns of
nonemployment, however, exhibit an interesting asymmetry between the two countries.  In
Canada, nonparticipation generally does not rise as much as unemployment as we move down the
wage distribution.  In the U.S., especially in 1989, it rises more, indicating that nonparticipation
accounts for a larger share of the nonworking time of unskilled U.S. than Canadian men.  14
       The importance of this zer o weeks category in Canada has also been noted by Card and Riddell
12
(1993). 
In Section 2, we argued that aggregate trends in employment and labour force participation
are consistent with an account of the Canada-US unemployment gap in men in both countries
responded to a decline in market wages by working less.  However, despite the fact that the wage
decline was somewhat less in Canada, the response was different because of institutional
differences between the two countries:  Canadian men reduced their labour supply more, and when
doing so were more likely to remain in the labour market, labelling their extra nonwork time as
unemployment rather than nonparticipation.
What elements do the disaggregated statistics in Tables 3 and 4 add to this “story” of what
happened to Canadian and US men between 1973 and 1989?  Three main things.  First, they
confirm that the largest declines in weeks worked did indeed occur in those segments of the wage
distribution where wages declined the most: the bottom.  In Canada, for example, Table 3
indicates that average weeks worked fell by 0.4 among the top three deciles, while falling by 2.2
among the bottom three; similar patterns are seen in the US, and in Table 4 which incorporates
individuals with zero weeks of work.  Second, a comparison of Table 3 (which considers workers
only) and 4 (which includes full-year nonworkers) suggests  that a substantial part of the greater
decline in Canadians' weeks of work can be attributed to an increase in the fraction of men
working zero weeks per year.    Third,  the cross-decile pattern of changes in weeks unemployed
12
strongly confirms the impression that the increase in unemployment among Canadian men did not
result from a shift between unemployment and nonparticipation among nonworking individuals;
rather it resulted from a decrease in employment: weeks unemployed increased in exactly the same15
       One potentiall y helpful way to quantify these statements is the following.  Consider two simple
13
models, a “Keynesi an” one in which labour force attachment is fixed and all shifts in unemployment
r esult from changes in employment ( )wks u=- )wksw), and a “relabelling” one in which employment
is  fixed a nd all changes in unemployment result from a relabelling of nonworking time ( )wksu= -
)wksn),  and use mean absolute deviations to compare the ability of the two  models to predict the
v a riation in  )wksu across deciles of the wage distribution. In Table 4, mean absolute deviations of
t he “Keynesian” and “relabelling” models respectively  are .44 and 1.42 for Canada; 1.53 and 1.20 for
the  U.S.  T hus for Canadian males, changes in weeks worked do a much better job of predictin g
c hanges in unemployment than do changes in nonparticipation;  in the U.S., weeks of nonparticipation
actually do somewhat better. 
segments of the wage distribution that employment fell, and by very close to the same amount.
And finally, as for the aggregate trends, this close correspondence between reductions in
employment and increases in unemployment does not characterize the U.S.    This points out the
13
importance, in accounting for the Canada-US unemployment gap, of differences in the
“destinations” of Canadian and US men when they work less: as a group, Canadian men largely
left employment for unemployment; the US male labour force on the other hand shifted largely
into nonparticipation.  
4. The Magnitude of Labour Supply Responses:  Are the Declines in Men’s Market Wages
Big Enough to Explain the Secular Decrease in Employment? 
In order to assess whether the declines in men’s market wages observed between 1973 and
1989 are sufficient to explain what happened to employment over this period, some independent
measure of men’s labour supply elasticities is needed.   One such source, suggested by JMT, is
the cross-sectional covariation between wages and employment across deciles of the wage
distribution.  Indeed, JMT present several pieces of evidence to argue that such cross-sectional
patterns  provide quite a good means of predicting the labour-supply responses of American men
to wage changes over time.  In this section, we ask whether the actual responses of American and16
      This may be even more surprising given  that, because of the decline in real wages, the men in
14
1989 will be drawn from higher up in the wage distribution.  If one believed that tastes for
Canadian men to wage changes between 1973 and 1989 correspond to what one would expect
from the cross-sectional patterns observed here.
Perhaps the easiest way to see whether the changes in men’s work behaviour between 1973
and 1989 is consistent with movements along a cross-sectional labour supply curve is simply to
plot the cross-sectional “labour supply” loci from Tables 3 and 4.  This is done in Figures 1 and
2 for the “raw” labour supply numbers in Table 3 (which group workers according to their actual
wages and exclude those with zero weeks of work) and in Figures 3 and 4 for the Table 4 numbers
(based on predicted wages and including those with zero weeks in Figure 4).  These figures clearly
show the following: with the possible exception of the bottom wage decile (though this exception
disappears when we include those with zero weeks), the 1973 and 1989 cross-sectional labour
supply loci for the US essentially coincide.  The declines in men’s weeks of work in the U.S.
between 1973 and 1989 are thus entirely consistent with movements along a stable labour supply
curve, which is identified from cross-section data.  This is consistent with JMT’s results, which
attribute essentially all the decline in US male employment to such wage declines.    
Interestingly, while wage declines clearly seem to play a role in the decline of Canadian
male employment between 1973 and 1989, their ability to explain these trends is not as impressive
as in the U.S.  Instead, except for the top wage decile (which we argue is likely subject to some
serious measurement error problems), Canadian men’s labour supply locus seems quite clearly to
have shifted to the left.  In other words, if we compare Canadian men earning the same real
wage in 1989 and in 1973, the men in 1989 will be working significantly less.   Unlike the
1417
work  were positively correlated with rank in the wage distribution, one would expect these men to
work  more at the same wage.  
U.S., therefore, it appears that declining real wages cannot explain all the decline in Canadian
male employment.  Indeed, as Tables 3 and 4 remind us, while the employment declines were
concentrated in the bottom wage deciles, there were substantial employment declines, and
unemployment increases, even in the top and middle of the Canadian wage distribution, where
wage declines were absent or insubstantial.  Clearly a JMT-style ‘labour supply response’ model
cannot explain these changes.  We conclude that any complete explanation of the secular increase
in Canadian unemployment must also be able to account for the substantial decreases in
employment occurring quite high up in the Canadian male wage distribution, which cannot be
explained by wage polarization.    
5.  Trends across recession years: 1975/77-1992. 
In this section we replicate most of the results in the previous sections, which focused on
“full employment” years, for years in which the unemployment rate reached a local maximum,
before and after the emergence of the Canada-US unemployment gap.  The years considered are
1992 in both countries, 1975 in the US, and 1977 in Canada.  While --because of the widely
touted greater severity of the 1992 recession in Canada than the U.S-- perhaps not as informative
about secular changes in unemployment rates, these figures give us some idea of more recent
developments in the structure of wages, employment and unemployment patterns in these two
countries, and of whether more recent trends are consistent with the patterns identified in previous
sections.  18
Table 5 presents summary statistics on wage polarization, analogous to Table 1.  It shows
the same pattern of wage polarization observed before; the main difference is considerably greater
real wage declines in Canada than were seen up to 1989.   Aggregate trends in employment and
unemployment between 1975/77 and 1992 are shown in Table 6.  Like the earlier period, these
show a substantial decline in Canadian employment (4.3 weeks), most of which took the form of
increased unemployment (3.1 weeks).  The main difference for Canada is the size of these
changes, reflecting the widening of the Canada-US unemployment gap in the 1990's.   As in the
comparison of full employment years, unemployment of US men remained essentially unchanged.
Most surprisingly, however, there is now also essentially no change in the employment levels of
US men between 1975 and 1992, despite the very large real wage declines between these two
years observed in Table 5. 
The disaggregated statistics of Tables 7 and 8 replicate many of the trends found in Tables
3 and 4.  For example, we again see the strong link between wage declines and employment
declines in Canada: declines in weeks worked are strongly concentrated in those wage deciles
which experienced the largest wage declines.  As for 1973-89, however, Figures 5 and 7 show
that the employment declines are greater than what one would expect based on cross-sectional
patterns: the cross-section labour supply locus shifts leftwards between these two years, and
especially in the upper wage deciles, there are declines in employment that apparently cannot
easily be  “explained” by falling real wages.  Tables 7 and 8 also show, once again, the strong
link between employment declines and increases in unemployment in Canada: those deciles with
the biggest employment declines had the biggest increased in unemployment.   Finally, we again
see the absence of a strong link between employment changes and unemployment changes in the19
U.S.   The main new feature of the 1975-92 comparisons,  as suggested by the aggregate figures,
is the apparent absence of a link between wage declines and declines in employment in the U.S.
Indeed, although there appears to be some tendency for men in the top deciles to work more, and
those in the bottom deciles to work less, the most striking feature of Tables 7 and 8 concerns men
in the bottom deciles:  even those U.S. men in the bottom wage deciles, whose real wages fell
by a quarter over this period, did not work significantly less in 1992 than in 1975.   Unless
this phenomenon, which shows up in Figures 6 and 8 as an outward shift in the US cross-
sectional labour supply locus,  can be convincingly shown to result from differences in the severity
of the two recessions  in the U.S.,  it again casts some doubt on the ability of wage changes alone
to explain employment changes over time.
In sum, examination of changes between the 1975/77 and 1992 recessions reveals a number
of patterns that confirm our findings for the 1973-1989 business cycle peaks, including the pattern
of wage changes in the two countries, and the apparent link between these wage changes and both
employment and unemployment in Canada.  They also raise some interesting new puzzles,
including the question of why U.S. male employment did not fall despite the large wage declines
experienced there, and why Canadian male employment fell much more than would be suggested
by the cross-sectional pattern of wages and weeks worked in that country.  While some of the
answers to these questions may involve purely cyclical factors, they would seem to warrant further
study, perhaps using more years of data, or data disaggregated by region, to try to get a better
understanding of the effects of cyclical versus secular changes.
6. Summary. 20
In this paper we have examined the role played by the declining demand for unskilled
labour, in combination with differences in the institutional structure of the Canadian and US
labour markets,  in the emergence of the Canada-US unemployment rate gap among prime-age
men in the 1980's.  A key hypothesis which we wanted to assess is linked with recent positions
taken by the OECD, and runs roughly as follows.  First, (because of factors like skill-biased
technical change) the demand for unskilled labour fell in both countries, leading to a substantial
decline in wages available to these workers.  Further, because of the more generous Canadian
social safety net, Canadian men were more likely to respond to this decline in offered wages by
leaving employment than U.S. men, who had little choice but to continue working at lower wages.
Overall, we find a number of trends in wages, employment, and unemployment across skill
levels in Canada and the U.S. which suggest that declining skill demand played some role in both
rising Canadian unemployment and the emergence of the unemployment gap over this period. 
Annual weeks of work did indeed fall in both countries precisely in those segments of the
population (unskilled workers) where wages were falling the most.  Also consistent with the
OECD story, both in the aggregate and across segments of the wage distribution, employment fell
more in response to a smaller wage decline in Canada than in the US.  Further, at least in Canada
this decline in employment corresponded quite closely to an increase in weeks of unemployment.
Our analysis in this paper however also indicates quite clearly that the JMT/OECD story
cannot by itself explain  all of what went on over this period, for two reasons.  First, the relatively
small decline in US employment between 1973 and 1989 was not accompanied by an increase in
unemployment: instead unskilled US men seem to have left the labour market in large numbers
when their employment fell, while unskilled Canadian men did not, pointing to a role for21
differences in the labelling of this additional nonworking time in explaining the Canada-US
unemployment gap.  Second, unlike the US --where the cross-section association between wages
and weeks of work yields a surprisingly good prediction of the effect of wage declines over time--,
the declines in Canadian male employment between 1973 and 1989 are greater than what one
would expect based on cross-sectional patterns. This apparent cross-national difference in the
relationship between cross-sectional and time-series labour supply patterns, which is seen
even more strongly in data comparing the 1975/77 and 1992 recessions, poses an interesting
puzzle for further research on this subject.  Indeed, we view such research as essential to
producing a more precise, quantitative estimate of the role of shifting skill demand in the
emergence of the Canada-US unemployment gap. 22
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UNEMPLOYED
WEEKS WORKED IN THE REFERENCE YEAR: CPS 1973, 75, 89 & 92
Persons are classified according to the number of different weeks, during the preceding calendar
year, in which they did any civilian work for pay or profit (including paid vacations and sick
leave) or worked without pay on a family operated farm or business.
WEEKS WORKED IN THE REFERENCE YEAR: SCF 1973, 77, 89 & 92
This variable gives the actual number of weeks in which the individual did any work in the
reference year.  Included in weeks worked are:
(a) the number of weeks in which the person did any work, either part-time or full-time;
(b) the number of weeks the person had a job but was not at work due to holidays, vacation,
illness, maternity leave, strike or lock-out;
(c) the number of weeks a person was self-employed; and
(d) the number of weeks a person had a job but was absent with pay(e.g. for job-related
training, etc.)
WEEKS UNEMPLOYED IN THE REFERENCE YEAR: CPS 1973, 75, 89 & 92
Persons are classified according to the number of weeks in the preceding year in which they were
unemployed.  Unemployed persons are those civilians who, during the survey week, have no
employment but are available for work, and (1) have engaged in any specific job seeking activity
within the past 4 weeks such as registering at a public or private employment office, meetings with
prospective employers, checking with friends or relatives, placing or answering advertisements,
writing letters of application, or being on a union or professional register; (2) are waiting to be
called back to a job from which they had been laid off; or (3) are waiting to report to a new wage
or salary job within 30 days.
WEEKS UNEMPLOYED IN THE REFERENCE YEAR: SCF 1973, 75, 89 & 92
This variable gives the actual number of weeks during the reference year in which the individual
did no work but looked for work.  Weeks in which the individual did any work, even for one hour
only, but looked for work the rest of the week, are counted as weeks worked. Unemployed
persons are those who during the reference week: (a) were without work, had actively looked for
work and were available for work; (b) were not actively looking for work but had been on layoff
for twenty-six weeks or less and were available for work; or (c) were not actively looking work
but had a new job to start in four weeks or less from the reference week, and were available for
work.TABLE 1: Measures of Real Wage Changes, Men Aged 25-54, 1973-1989
(a) Percentiles of Real Annual Earnings, 
     Men working Full time and Full year.
Percentile 1973 1989 % Change
90 $61,271 $63,924 4.3%
CANADA 50 $36,295 $37,558 3.5%
10 $19,272 $16,670 -13.5%
90 $75,378 $75,972 0.8%
USA 50 $42,435 $38,653 -8.9%
10 $21,977 $16,660 -24.2%
(b) Percentiles of Average Weekly Earnings, 
Men working Full time.
Percentile 1973 1989 % Change
90 $1,204 $1,236 2.7%
CANADA 50 $698 $705 1.1%
10 $356 $286 -19.5%
90 $1,460 $1,437 -1.5%
USA 50 $803 $687 -14.5%
10 $365 $267 -27.0%
NOTES  In these and the following tables, Canadian Data comes from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF)
while the U.S. data comes from the Current Population Survey (CPS).  Both draw on microdata files.
Values are all in 1992 Canadian Dollars, converted using the Canadian and U.S. all items
Consumer Price Indexes and the PENN World Tables (vers 5.6) Purchasing Power Parity series.
24TABLE 2:Annual Weeks Worked, Unemployed and Out of the Labour Force
Canada and the U.S., 1973 and 1989.
1973 1989 Change
WksW 46.9                44.8              -2.1
CANADA WksU 1.9                  3.6                1.7
WksN 3.2                  3.6                0.4
WksW 45.9                44.9              -1.0
USA WksU 2.1                  1.8                -0.3
WksN 4.0                  5.3                1.3
 
25TABLE 3: Mean Wages, Weeks Worked and Unemployed, 1973-1989,
by Percentiles of the Real Weekly Earnings Distribution:
Men with positive weeks worked.
Decile  1973 1989        1973-1989 Changes
Group
CANADA WageWksW WksU WksN WageWksW WksU WksN Wage (%) WksW WksU WksN
90-100 1,701 $   47.2 1.7 3.1 1,698 $     46.3 3.6 2.1 0% -0.9 1.9 -1.0
80-90 1,079 $   48.4 1.3 2.3 1,122 $     48.9 1.7 1.4 4% 0.4 0.4 -0.8
70-80 921 $      49.2 1.1 1.7 961 $        48.5 2.0 1.5 4% -0.7 0.9 -0.2
60-70 818 $      49.2 1.1 1.7 847 $        48.7 2.1 1.3 4% -0.5 1.0 -0.5
50-60 737 $      49.2 1.1 1.7 748 $        48.4 2.4 1.2 1% -0.9 1.3 -0.4
40-50 665 $      49.1 1.3 1.6 662 $        48.5 2.2 1.2 -1% -0.6 1.0 -0.4
30-40 595 $      49.0 1.5 1.6 569 $        47.2 3.3 1.5 -4% -1.8 1.8 0.0
20-30 517 $      48.1 2.0 1.9 473 $        45.7 4.6 1.7 -8% -2.4 2.6 -0.2
10-20 416 $      46.8 3.1 2.1 353 $        44.7 5.4 1.9 -15% -2.2 2.4 -0.2
 0-10 243 $      46.1 3.2 2.7 181 $        43.5 5.5 2.9 -25% -2.6 2.3 0.2
All Deciles769 $      48.2          1.7            2.0 761 $        47.0          3.3           1.7 -1% -1.2 1.6 -0.4
USA         
90-100 2,113 $   48.7 1.3 2.0 2,062 $     48.6 1.0 2.4 -2% -0.1 -0.3 0.4
80-90 1,311 $   49.4 1.6 1.0 1,256 $     48.9 1.0 2.1 -4% -0.5 -0.6 1.1
70-80 1,095 $   49.3 1.3 1.4 1,025 $     49.4 0.8 1.8 -6% 0.0 -0.5 0.4
60-70 956 $      49.1 1.8 1.1 874 $        49.6 0.7 1.7 -9% 0.6 -1.1 0.6
50-60 853 $      49.8 1.2 1.0 753 $        48.9 1.3 1.9 -12% -1.0 0.1 0.9
40-50 761 $      49.6 1.1 1.3 641 $        49.0 1.1 1.9 -16% -0.6 0.0 0.6
30-40 678 $      49.2 1.7 1.1 540 $        48.8 1.3 2.0 -20% -0.4 -0.4 0.8
20-30 572 $      48.8 2.3 0.9 443 $        47.0 2.2 2.8 -23% -1.8 -0.1 1.9
10-20 443 $      47.7 3.2 1.0 334 $        45.8 2.8 3.4 -25% -1.9 -0.5 2.4
 0-10 207 $      46.7 5.5 -0.2 169 $        41.5 4.5 6.0 -18% -5.1 -1.1 6.2
All Deciles899 $      48.8          2.1            1.1 810 $        47.8          1.7           2.6 -10% -1.1 -0.5 1.5
26TABLE 4: Mean Wages, Weeks Worked and Unemployed, 1973-1989,
by Percentiles of the Predicted Wage Distribution, All Men.
Decile  1973 1989        1973-1989 Changes
Group
CANADA WageWksW WksU WksN WageWksW WksU WksN Wage (%) WksW WksU WksN
90-100 $1,118 48.4 0.6 3.0 $1,157 48.8 0.9 2.3 3% 0.4 0.3 -0.7
80-90 $908 49.0 0.8 2.3 $859 48.0 1.5 2.5 -5% -1.0 0.8 0.2
70-80 $824 48.7 0.6 2.7 $817 46.8 2.1 3.1 -1% -1.9 1.5 0.4
60-70 $802 48.7 0.9 2.4 $754 47.3 2.3 2.4 -6% -1.3 1.4 0.0
50-60 $749 48.2 1.2 2.6 $718 46.6 2.3 3.1 -4% -1.6 1.2 0.5
40-50 $694 48.2 1.4 2.4 $655 45.0 3.7 3.3 -6% -3.2 2.3 0.9
30-40 $647 46.8 1.8 3.3 $632 43.9 4.4 3.7 -2% -3.0 2.6 0.3
20-30 $608 45.6 2.9 3.6 $605 42.6 5.7 3.7 -1% -3.0 2.8 0.2
10-20 $570 44.7 3.6 3.7 $554 41.5 5.9 4.7 -3% -3.2 2.3 0.9
 0-10 $480 41.1 5.1 5.7 $439 37.1 7.3 7.6 -9% -4.1 2.2 1.9
All Deciles $740 46.9 1.9 3.2 $719 44.8 3.6 3.6 -3% -2.2 1.7 0.4
USA
90-100 $1,328 48.6 0.8 2.7 $1,291 48.9 0.7 2.5 -3% 0.3 -0.1 -0.2
80-90 $1,093 47.8 1.0 3.1 $1,037 48.2 0.9 3.0 -5% 0.3 -0.2 -0.2
70-80 $954 47.5 1.5 3.1 $923 47.7 1.0 3.3 -3% 0.2 -0.5 0.3
60-70 $895 47.2 1.9 2.9 $827 46.2 1.3 4.4 -8% -1.0 -0.5 1.5
50-60 $831 46.8 1.7 3.5 $761 46.1 1.8 4.2 -8% -0.7 0.1 0.7
40-50 $792 46.3 2.1 3.6 $673 44.9 1.9 5.1 -15% -1.4 -0.1 1.5
30-40 $751 45.5 2.6 3.9 $631 43.9 1.9 6.2 -16% -1.6 -0.7 2.3
20-30 $699 45.1 2.6 4.2 $564 44.4 2.3 5.3 -19% -0.8 -0.3 1.1
10-20 $604 43.6 2.9 5.5 $492 41.3 2.9 7.8 -19% -2.3 0.0 2.3
 0-10 $462 41.0 4.0 7.0 $379 37.5 3.2 11.2 -18% -3.4 -0.7 4.2
All Deciles $841 45.9 2.1 4.0 $758 44.9 1.8 5.3 -10% -1.0 -0.3 1.3
27TABLE 5: Measures of Real Wage Changes, Men Aged 25-54, 1975/77 - 1992
(a) Percentiles of Real Annual Earnings, 
     Men working Full time and Full year
.
Percentile1975/77 1992 % Change
90 $64,427 $65,000 0.9%
CANADA 50 $39,705 $37,856 -4.7%
10 $19,982 $16,500 -17.4%
90 $72,149 $73,036 1.2%
USA 50 $39,991 $35,340 -11.6%
10 $20,782 $15,314 -26.3%
(b) Percentiles of Average Weekly Earnings, 
Men working Full time
Percentile1975/77 1992 % Change
90 $1,268 $1,243 -2.0%
CANADA 50 $751 $692 -7.9%
10 $352 $288 -18.2%
90 $1,359 $1,359 0.0%
USA 50 $765 $662 -13.5%
10 $361 $271 -24.9%
The base year for Canada is 1977 and for the USA is 1975.
28TABLE 6: Annual Weeks Worked, Unemployed and Out of the Labour Force
1975/77 1992
WksW 47.1                42.8              -4.3
CANADA WksU 2.5                  5.6                3.1
WksN 2.4                  3.6                1.2
WksW 44.4                44.1              -0.3
USA WksU 2.9                  3.0                0.1
WksN 4.7                  4.9                0.2
 
29TABLE 7: Mean Wages, Weeks Worked and Unemployed, 1975/77 - 1992,,
by Percentiles of the Real Weekly Earnings Distribution,
Men with Positive Weeks Worked .
Decile  1975/1977       1992        1975/77-1992 Changes
Group
CANADA Wage WksW WksUWksN Wage WksW WksU WksN Wage (%) WksW WksU WksN
90-100 $1,760 46.0 3.1 2.9 $1,722 47.2 4.1 0.7 -2% 1.2 1.0 -2.2
80-90 $1,136 50.1 1.4 0.5 $1,117 49.4 2.3 0.3 -2% -0.7 0.9 -0.2
70-80 $980 50.1 1.2 0.7 $956 48.7 3.0 0.3 -2% -1.4 1.8 -0.4
60-70 $876 50.3 1.3 0.4 $838 49.0 2.5 0.5 -4% -1.3 1.2 0.1
50-60 $791 50.1 1.3 0.6 $742 48.3 3.5 0.2 -6% -1.8 2.2 -0.4
40-50 $714 50.3 1.2 0.5 $654 48.4 3.2 0.4 -9% -1.9 2.0 -0.1
30-40 $635 49.9 1.6 0.5 $563 47.1 4.2 0.7 -11% -2.8 2.6 0.2
20-30 $548 49.0 2.3 0.7 $470 45.7 5.1 1.2 -14% -3.3 2.8 0.5
10-20 $432 47.4 3.4 1.2 $357 44.8 6.4 0.8 -17% -2.6 3.0 -0.4
 0-10 $212 45.7 4.6 1.7 $179 43.0 7.0 2.0 -16% -2.7 2.4 0.3
All Deciles $808 48.9 2.1 1.0 $760 47.2 4.1 0.7 -6% -1.7 2.0 -0.3
USA
90-100 $1,975 48.8 1.5 1.7 $1,878 49.7 1.3 1.0 -5% 0.9 -0.2 -0.6
80-90 $1,205 49.2 1.6 1.1 $1,195 50.2 1.3 0.6 -1% 0.9 -0.4 -0.5
70-80 $1,018 49.4 1.8 0.8 $965 50.3 1.0 0.6 -5% 1.0 -0.8 -0.2
60-70 $900 49.3 1.8 0.9 $826 49.9 1.3 0.7 -8% 0.7 -0.5 -0.2
50-60 $805 49.2 1.9 0.9 $708 49.5 1.6 0.9 -12% 0.3 -0.3 0.0
40-50 $715 49.2 1.9 0.9 $607 49.3 1.7 1.0 -15% 0.1 -0.2 0.1
30-40 $628 48.7 2.2 1.1 $512 47.6 3.0 1.4 -18% -1.1 0.8 0.3
20-30 $544 47.9 2.8 1.3 $417 47.6 2.8 1.6 -23% -0.3 0.0 0.3
10-20 $433 45.8 4.3 1.9 $319 46.1 4.0 1.9 -26% 0.3 -0.2 -0.1
 0-10 $251 43.6 5.0 3.5 $182 41.9 6.7 3.5 -27% -1.7 1.7 0.0
All Deciles $847 48.1 2.5 1.4 $761 48.2 2.5 1.3 -10% 0.1 0.0 -0.1
30TABLE 8: Mean Wages, Weeks Worked and Unemployed, 1975/77 - 1992,
by Percentiles of the Predicted Wage Distribution, All Men .
Decile  1975/1977       1992          1975/77-1992 Changes
Group
CANADA WageWksW WksU WksN Wage WksW WksU WksN Wage (%) WksW WksU WksN
90-100 $1,072 49.7 0.8 1.5 $1,092 48.5 2.2 1.3 2% -1.2 1.4 -0.2
80-90 $919 49.8 1.0 1.3 $835 47.1 3.1 1.8 -9% -2.7 2.2 0.5
70-80 $846 49.6 1.2 1.2 $769 45.5 4.0 2.5 -9% -4.1 2.8 1.3
60-70 $807 49.4 1.3 1.2 $700 46.0 3.9 2.1 -13% -3.4 2.5 0.9
50-60 $756 48.4 2.1 1.5 $654 44.7 4.5 2.8 -13% -3.7 2.4 1.3
40-50 $729 47.7 2.1 2.2 $598 42.7 5.5 3.8 -18% -4.9 3.4 1.5
30-40 $704 46.7 2.7 2.6 $544 41.6 5.8 4.6 -23% -5.1 3.0 2.1
20-30 $652 45.0 4.0 3.0 $507 39.6 8.1 4.3 -22% -5.3 4.1 1.2
10-20 $626 44.7 4.3 3.0 $441 37.5 8.8 5.7 -30% -7.1 4.5 2.7
 0-10 $515 40.3 5.6 6.0 $363 35.0 10.0 7.0 -29% -5.3 4.4 1.0
All Deciles $763 47.1 2.5 2.4 $650 42.8 5.6 3.6 -15% -4.3 3.1 1.2
USA
90-100 $1,240 48.2 1.0 2.9 $1,221 49.0 1.1 1.9 -2% 0.8 0.1 -0.9
80-90 $1,005 47.6 1.4 3.0 $920 47.8 1.7 2.5 -8% 0.2 0.3 -0.5
70-80 $869 46.9 2.1 2.9 $838 47.4 1.8 2.8 -3% 0.4 -0.3 -0.1
60-70 $814 46.0 2.4 3.6 $721 44.8 2.5 4.7 -11% -1.2 0.1 1.1
50-60 $751 45.7 2.6 3.7 $657 44.8 2.9 4.2 -13% -0.9 0.3 0.5
40-50 $725 45.7 2.3 4.0 $595 44.5 3.0 4.5 -18% -1.2 0.7 0.5
30-40 $661 43.4 3.7 4.9 $556 43.1 3.4 5.6 -16% -0.4 -0.3 0.7
20-30 $607 42.8 3.6 5.6 $487 41.6 3.9 6.5 -20% -1.2 0.3 0.9
10-20 $549 41.0 4.6 6.4 $415 40.8 4.5 6.7 -24% -0.3 -0.1 0.3
 0-10 $425 36.9 5.1 10.0 $316 36.8 5.5 9.8 -26% -0.1 0.4 -0.3
All Deciles $765 44.4 2.9 4.7 $673 44.1 3.0 4.9 -12% -0.4 0.1 0.2
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